b.
The
correction of Platonic ideas by the Christian
faith
The
second historical element that the Church had
reacted to, by means of the Symbol of Faith (the
Creed), was the idea concerning creation; an
idea that the philosophy of that era indulged
in, which had its beginning in Platonism and
continued through to neo-Platonism, which in
turn had wrought other changes to the original
Platonic theory.
I
might remind you at this point of the basic
positions of Platonism, which the Church had
reacted to, through the Symbol.
The
pure form of Platonism appears in the work “Timaeus”
by Plato. In it, God is actually referred to as
“Creator” and “Father” but also as the “Nous”
(=mind, intellect). Consequently, we have there
–in relation to Gnosticism – a certain kinship
between Christian thought and Platonism, but not
with Gnosticism. However, there are other basic
points, where Patristic thought had disagreed
with Platonism, and they are the following:
First of all,
it
was the notion that God created the world out of
pre-existing matter and pre-existing ideas. In
other words, Platonism had accepted a
creator-God out of necessity, because it was
impossible for it to not give form to
ideas that pre-existed, and to matter. It was
forced to give chaos a certain form. It was
obliged to create the world. It was a compulsory
thing. This perception, which introduced the
notion of necessity in creation, was
replaced by the Christian perception of
creation, whose position was that the world was
created out of the free volition/will of God,
and not out of any necessity. Furthermore,
in
order to confront the Platonic ideas regarding
creation, the Church and Patristic theology
needed to clarify the notion of the world being
created
from nil.
In other words, it needed to stress that matter
was not pre-existent; even with
Plautinus later on,
who presented the world as an extension, an
effluence of the thoughts of the One’s
Nous (mind); a
Nous that diffused
into many things, and that the world was created
from this diffusion of God’s thoughts. This
perception of creation could not be accepted by
the Church, because it again signified that the
world was somehow a necessary extension
of God’s existence. In other words, God somehow
“extended” His very self or His thoughts to
create the world, and in this way, God and the
world become eternally and inseparably bound
together, and the world thus somehow became
eternal also, just like God.
In
Origen, we note an attempt to express both of
the previous concepts together, in his assertion
that the world was created from nil, but, that
creation itself was an eternal-perpetual act of
God. In other words, he introduced the
eternality of creation, by arguing that God
could not be almighty unless He had objects,
upon which He could impose His almightiness.
Therefore, this meant that a form of creation
must have existed eternally. But this view
caused problems; therefore it too had to be
rejected. So, we are left with the perception
that the world was created out of absolutely
nothing; that it was not pre-existent in
God’s thoughts, but was the result of God’s
absolute free volition, hence the expression
"çí
ðïôå
üôå
ïõê
çí",
(there was a time that it was not) - an
expression that should be taken literally, in
its absolute sense: The world did not
previously exist, not even in God’s mind.
This point needs a lot of clarification, because
a difficulty arises in the idea that the
creation of the world through God’s Logos was a
“pre-eternal volition”, intended for the
salvation of the world. Does this pre-eternal
will of God presuppose an eternality of the
world? Well?
Does it?
Yes,
or no?
This is a
very
complicated
problem.
God
did not want this world to somehow appear
abruptly, but He also did not resort to any
pre-existing ideas when creating the world.
The
first one to develop this idea of the world
being created from nil was
Theophilos
of Antioch, who had deeply influenced Ireneos.
Ireneos had based his theology to a large extent
on Theophilos of
Antioch. In his “Epistle to Autolykos” 2,4,
he said that God created from nil whatever He
wanted and however He wanted. The idea
therefore of God’s volition, of God’s freedom,
was linked to the notion of creation from nil.
Ireneos developed this idea more extensively,
and eventually, it became a part of Patristic
theology; it was also developed by Tertullian,
Athanasius,
e.a., thus
consolidating the concept that the world was
created from nil. We shall see, when
interpreting the dogma on creation, what this
means. Now that we are examining it
historically, we need to point out that this
idea of “from nil” must be taken in an absolute,
literal context. Because, historically speaking
once again, during the time that the Symbol of
Faith was being formulated, Platonism had
undergone several changes, which at first glance
gave the impression that God did not
create the world out of pre-existing matter and
pre-existing ideas. But this did not
automatically denote that He created out of
nothing. Out of
nothing,
that is,
in the
absolute
sense.
Specifically,
middle Platonism with
Albinus and Philon had rejected the
concept that we encountered in Plato’s “Timaeus”,
where God created out of pre-existing matter and
pre-existing ideas. They realized that this
concept could not be reconciled with the Bible,
so they entertained the idea that matter was
created by God (which Christians agreed with),
but there still remained a problem with the
ideas, since they continued to be Platonists and
could not admit that the ideas were also created
by God. They found an outlet for this, by
asserting that ideas were thoughts that resided
in the Nous
(mind/intellect) of God. Eternal thoughts. It
was from these ‘eternal thoughts’ inside the
mind of God, as expounded by
Albinus and moreso
by Philon, that
Neo-Platonism originated. Thus, we can now also
say that the world always existed, as an eternal
thought in the mind of God.
To
this, only Saint
Maximus
gave a comprehensive reply, by stressing that
God (to Whom the notions of ‘before’ and ‘after’
do not have any relevance, within His eternal
status) had eternally willed the
existence of the world. But, to have willed it
eternally does not mean that He instantly
brought it into existence. In other words,
Maximus provides us
with this distinction between ‘volition’ and
‘existence’. God may have willed the
existence of the world pre-eternally, but
when the world was eventually created, it was
created without this act (of creation)
constituting a necessary extension of
God’s pre-eternal volition; furthermore, the
Logos –through Whom and in Whom God created the
world– is that same Logos with Whom God has an
eternal loving relationship of Father and Son,
and the existence of the world did not
constitute a necessary consequence of this
loving, Father-Son relationship, even if the
will to create the world was pre-eternal. What
is important in Saint
Maximus,
is the distinction between God’s will and the
realization of God’s will. If we do not discern
between these two things, then we are obliged to
say that the world is eternal, because God’s
will was pre-eternal. (see
“To Thalassios, 60,
Apora).
So,
we have now discerned between a) the thoughts of
God, b) His will and c) the realization of God’s
will. The Neo-Platonics
regarded the thoughts of God as something
eternal, thus, by linking the world with God’s
thoughts, they inevitably made the world
eternal. Maximus’
contribution was that he introduced the will
of God. The will to create the world is
eternal. But he discerned between the will and
the realization of that will, thus denying the
eternality of the world.
God
has His thoughts, and the world has all the
various beings, all of which have
a
logos
(reason) for being. The
logos
(reason)
for
the existence of beings
is
linked to the sum of God’s thoughts (which is
the single Logos of God). But He has these logos
(reasons) for the existence of beings inside
Him, in the form of His thoughts. These are
basically uncreated logos
(reasons).
This
of
course is an anachronism, to say that the logos
are uncreated, (in the eras of
Arianism and the
Cappadocians), as these matters were cleared up
after the 2nd Ecumenical Synod.
According to Arius,
the Logos was situated at the lowest level,
because it belonged to the world. For the years
leading up to Arius,
the Logos was placed between God and the world,
depending on how each case perceived matters.
Anyway, somewhere between God and the world. It
was the Council (Synod) of Nicaea that irrevocably transferred the
Logos into the realm of the Uncreated. What
remains now, is to see how the logos (reason)
for the existence of beings is linked to God.
This is why we do not encounter the meaning of
“Logos” until the time of Maximus. The Fathers avoided it,
because it was a dangerous area.
Maximus
dared to make this bold theological move of
utilizing the meaning of the term “Logos”. But
for now, he just makes this distinction. God has
His Logos; there is a loving relationship
between the Father and the Logos, between God
and the Logos. The world is created, in the
Logos, through the Logos.
But, now that he is utilizing the notion of
God’s will for the existence of the world and
not any direct, gnostic extension of God’s
thoughts into the world, he refrains from
stating that this connection is a compulsory
connection; it has become a willed
connection, in other words it is a freely
decided connection. There does
exist a pre-eternal
will of God, but, this pre-eternal will of
God is realized, in the Logos, through the Logos.
In other words, it is a
volition, it is a will, and not a
compulsory extension of God’s thoughts. God
wills to create the world at a given time. This
eternal will of His does not mean that His
thought is instantly extended. The world is no
longer regarded as a thought inside God’s
Nous (mind).
Thoughts are perceived as the logos (reasons)
for the existence of beings; he now associates
the logos of beings to the wills of God,
and not the thoughts of God. Wills,
logos and
predestinations now
relate to
each
other.
Obviously, this is a revolution (when compared
to what was said earlier), which facilitates us
in eliminating that “extension of God’s thoughts
into the world”. Because wills presuppose the
freedom to be realized or not be realized (and
this is precisely where the distinction lies, in
the realization and the non-realization of
wills). This is the basic difference between a
thought (which, one way or another, is realized,
must be realized, in order to be fulfilled) and
on the other hand, a will (which, precisely
because it is a will, does not mean it is a
necessary consequence of a thought). Therefore a
will, even if realized, does not connect or
relate its realization with
foresight/providence, in the sense of a thought.
To think of something and to realize something,
are not two, related things, precisely because
they are wills.
By
relating wills with the logos (reasons),
Maximus managed to
avoid the ‘necessity of creation’. In other
words,
he
avoided associating the logos (reasons) for the
existence of beings to the thoughts in the
Nous of God. After
this, we veer away from Platonism, away from
Philon and Neo-Platonism (where the logos of
beings are associated with the thoughts of God).
This is where the basic difference is, where the
crucial point is: when associating the logos of
beings with the wills of God and not the
thoughts of God, they make the world the
result of God’s will and not God’s thought.
And because it is a result of will and not of
thought, it is a result of free decision and not
a necessity.
In
recapitulating the basic points, we need to
mention that the concept of creation began as a
reaction to Gnosticism and Platonism. In
Gnosticism, the Church reacted by stressing the
coincidence of the terms “Creator” and “Father”
as well as the direct involvement of God in
Creation. As for Platonism,
the
Church reacted on one hand to the pure Platonism
of Plato, by stressing that the expression
“creation from nil” means: “creation, from no
pre-existing material, and no pre-existing
ideas”; on the other hand, the Church reacted to
middle Platonism and neo-Platonism, by
responding that the world did not
eternally exist in the Nous
of God, not even as a thought, but -as now
clarified through Maximus-
as wills of God. And because these wills were
linked to the Logos of God, the Son of God, it
was through their loving relationship that they
acquired an ontological basis, and the world
became a real entity, without ever constituting
a necessity for God.
In
other words, what Maximus
did was to philosophically evolve the views of
Saint Athanasius,
i.e., that the Son exists due to the essence of
the Father, while the world exists due to the
will/volition of the Father. To that which was
a mere design up until that time,
Maximus strove to
give a philosophical explanation, and in any
case, the result of that effort was to
demonstrate that the logos (reasons) for the
existence of beings are the wills of God (and
therefore freely decided by Him), and not the
thoughts of God (with a compulsory nature).
[*].
*
OODE
observation:
How could one dare to
attribute “thoughts”
to an Omniscient and
timeless God?
Thoughts are the
time-governed processes
of a NON
omniscient brain! A thinker
is one who does not know.
If he did know, he would not
think, he would simply will.