We
have seen
three basic distinctions in terminology, which are analyzed
even further by three other distinctions, which we
encounter in the Cappadocian Fathers and especially in Saint
Gregory the Theologian.
These
distinctions are made, for the following reason. The Arians
-and in fact the Eunomians - brought up the following issue
with the Orthodox: Does the Son denote the essence, or the
energy of God? If the Orthodox had replied that He denotes
the essence, then they could not discern between the Son and
the Father. If they had said that He is the name of an
energy, then they were at risk of accepting the Son as a
creation. Faced with this pressure, Saint Gregory stressed
in his third homily that the Son is neither the name of
an essence, nor of an energy; He is the name of a
relationship. But it is interesting to see how these are
discerned; how these three names are defined.
Saint Gregory the Theologian on this same
point and these three distinctions gives us his own
definition of each of these names. They are subtle
philosophical meanings, however, these distinctions are very
important.
He says that “essence” is that which is self-subsistent inside every
single thing. It is that thing, which one can refer to
uniquely, with regard to its own, unique existence. God’s
essence can be understood in this sense, regarding His
uniqueness. That is what is meant by “that which is
self-subsistent in every single thing”.
He says that “energy”
is “that which is perceivable in other things”; it is
something that is understood and is found inside something
else. One could also say that this thing that is observed
“in others” (or, the ‘event’ as we call it – as known in
Hellenic Philosophy) leads us into the concept of
“relationship” or association.
Despite all
these things that refer to the person or the hypostasis,
which he calls ‘association’, he clearly distinguishes them
from the essence and from the energy. The person or the
hypostasis is neither an essence, nor an energy. What is it
then? In order to see what it is, we must see what it is
NOT, with respect to the other two. We must see whether the
essence is something self-existent and self-subsistent, in
order to speak of the essence per se of a being. God is a
divine essence. It is not compulsory, to relate the Divine
essence –in our minds- with any other essence, in
order for us to refer to the essence.
Since the
person is not an essence, it must therefore be
something that cannot be understood as existing on is
own; it is not self-subsistent. If it was self-subsistent,
it would have been an essence. Thus, since it is not
an essence, it cannot be understood on its own. We cannot
isolate it. When you want to speak of a person, you need
to simultaneously refer to another being. You cannot refer
to it alone. Whereas with the essence, you can refer to
one, single essence, on its own. With a person or a
hypostasis, you cannot. On the other hand though, it is not
an energy either. And why isn’t it an energy? Because it is
not in communion with other beings, so that we can find it
elsewhere. Let’s take a look at this mysterious
fabrication.
On'
the one hand, the person cannot exist without any
communion with other beings, without an association. On
the other hand, that which is a person cannot be found in
another person, whereas an energy can. And an energy can be
common to both. Nature and essence are both common; however,
the essence can also logically be defined on its own. This
is what denotes the essence.
Thus, the
person –the hypostasis- denotes an identity, a being,
which, albeit unable to exist on its own, cannot be
perceived on its own, yet at the same time cannot be found
elsewhere. While it cannot exist on its own, at the same
time, it cannot be found elsewhere, except in its self. In
other words, its self is so unique, so unprecedented,
so much itself, that nobody else can be what it is. The
Father cannot be the Son, or the Spirit. The Son cannot be
the Father, or the Spirit. The terms: ‘Father’, ‘Son’
and ‘Spirit’ denote different hypostases or persons; they
are so unique and unprecedented, that the paradox and
most significant thing about them is that they cannot be
found in those entities with which they have no association:
they simply do not exist. Because, if the Father is not in a
relationship with the Son, He ceases to exist. And even so,
He still is not the Son.
That is the
person, i.e., it is the identity that is born of a
relationship - of a communion with another entity - which
results in non-communing, entities,
in the sense
that the one entity cannot be found within the other;
neither can it be found, if not in any association with the
other, because if that relationship is interrupted, then the
existence of that person is also interrupted. So, if the
person or the hypostasis is neither an essence nor an
energy, then it must not be self-subsistent either; in other
words, one cannot refer to the person singly, without
relating it to something else, nor refer to it as an energy,
in the sense that it can be found inside something else.
For example,
the energy of God. Let’s examine one of His energies: His
power. His power as an energy can be found in all three
Persons, and it is indeed found in all three Persons. It
can also be found outside of God; it can act outside of God.
This is called an ‘event’, i.e., that which we can also find
outside of the essence (which essence possesses the energy),
while the essence is distinguished from the energy, in that
we cannot find it outside of the essence. We cannot find
God’s essence inside creation. We can however find God’s
energy inside creation. The energy is that which can be
communed, even outside the essence. The essence cannot be
communed; it denotes self-subsistence; it cannot be
categorized outside itself, because it will cease to be the
essence of that being.
So, can the
person be communed? Well, yes and no. The person cannot
exist, if there is no communion and relationship – in other
words, if it doesn’t associate with other persons. One
person equals no person. One essence, yes. And one energy,
yes (when referring to its results).
But
one person, one hypostasis, equals no person. Hence,
there needs to be a communion of more than one, in order to
have persons.
But in this
communion, each person does have its so-called hypostatic features
(its personal characteristics),
which cannot be communed. The Father cannot impart His
paternity to the Son, nor His features. These hypostatic
features - of the ‘Father’, the Son’ and the ‘Holy
Spirit’, or, ‘non-birth’, ‘birth’ and “procedure from’ - none of them can be communed, or imparted. Why? Because
each one of the Persons is a unique and singular identity.
If it is substituted by something else, then it ceases to be
that unique identity. That is why, in regard to this
association, which denotes the hypostasis or the person,
the Fathers or the Cappadocians used the expression “selfsame”.
At first glance,
this “selfsame” appears to conflict with association. If we
are defining the person with respect to an association, how
can we define it as “selfsame” at the same time? And yet,
the “selfsame” springs from an association. The notion of
association is such that it creates a “selfsame”, a
uniqueness, a sameness, something that is non-communable,
which cannot be communed. Therefore, without communing with
the other persons - without any association – this
“selfsame” cannot exist. Thus,
each
person of the Holy Trinity is unique, singular,
irreplaceable, precisely because it is in an incessant
communion and association with the other persons.
Thus,
if you sever that communion, you lose the hypostasis.
Communion, therefore, is a prerequisite of the hypostasis.
On the
other hand, this communion creates particularity - selfsame
beings - which, when communing with them, when imparting the
characteristics of the one to the other, you lose them.
These are the basic items, and this is the way that these
terms are used in Patristic Theology.
We shall see
what these basic principles are, during the utilization of
these terms in Triadology. Because all the things we just
said are fine, and a philosopher will find them palpable to
a certain point. But when we apply them to Triadology, that
is when the continuity of Hellenic Philosophy is broken.
So, what are
the basic principles that the Fathers introduced, when
utilizing these terms, which we analyze during their
implementation in Dogmatics and especially in the Dogma
regarding God?
The
first
principle – as we already mentioned earlier – is that the “what
is” (i.e., the essence or the nature) of God cannot be
known, it cannot be conceived or comprehended by the mind.
This was naturally accepted by Neo-Platonism to an extent,
but, it was a basic principle of Hellenic Philosophy, of
Hellenic thought, that one can come to know
the essence of beings; that it can be
accomplished with the mind, which, having conceived the
idea, is led to the essence of beings.
In other words,
in order to ‘know’ the essence of this table, to know “what
it is”, then, according to Hellenic Philosophy – if I am
Platonically predisposed – I will look for the idea of
‘table’ within that very table. The table itself, no matter
how much it surpasses the actual table, nevertheless with my
mind –which mind can surpass the being: the objective, the
revelatory being(- I can perceive the imaginary table. The
more that my mind is pure, and cleansed of material things,
the more I can reach and perceive the imaginary, the mental
images.
If I am
predisposed by Aristotle, then I will look for the essence
of the table in its material hypostasis. Within this
material, this specific table, there are certain natural
laws that supposedly cause it to be a table. The conceiving
of these laws can be halted, by the mind. But, by
elaborating the natural and the objective laws (and not the
imaginary ones), it is possible to conceive the essence in
this other way.
According to
the Hellenic Fathers (if we go to the Western Fathers it is
a different situation, where we will examine in our future
lessons how Western Theology placed itself on this issue,
whereas the Eastern Fathers are very clear), the “what
is”, (the essence) of God cannot be conceived, cannot be
comprehended with the mind. “the Divine is infinite and
unintelligible, and only one thing about it is intelligible:
its infinity and its unintelligibility.”
(«Άπειρον το Θείον και
ακατάληπτον και έν μόνο αυτού καταληπτού η απειρία και η
ακαταληψία αυτού») (John the
Damascene).
We cannot
comprehend something by means of the mind. Because
comprehending presupposes precisely an energy of the mind.
A second
principle
introduced by
the Cappadocians and first underlined by Saint Basil the
Great, is that the essence (the “what is”) - does not exist
without the “how is” or the “as is” (the hypostasis).
An
essence without hypostasis does not exist; it cannot be
understood, as Basil the Great says. Bare essence cannot
exist. This is very important, because in ontology, the
“as is” has a primary position, along with the “what is”
(the essence).
Hellenic
philosophy always bestowed primacy to the “what is” (the
essence). The Cappadocian Fathers used this –one could call
it Aristotelian- concept, because Aristotle was actually
more useful to the Fathers than Plato. By using the
Aristotelian concept, they provided the distinction
between the ‘first essence’ and the ‘second essence’.
By ‘first
essence’, Aristotle denoted the specialized, the specific,
while ‘second’ denoted the more general. For example,
‘first essence’ denotes George, Kostas, John – the specific
persons. The ‘second essence’ denotes the general : i.e.
mankind, human nature, the essence of humanity which exists
both in Kostas and George and John.
However, divine
essence cannot come before the hypostases (persons),
because bare essence cannot exist.
It is likewise
impossible to speak of a general humankind with regard to
the human essence – i.e. with people – without also implying
individual, specific people. The same applies with God; one
cannot speak of God’s essence, without simultaneously
implying the “how He is”, or the Persons or the Hypostases
of God. Thus, the divine essence cannot logically precede
its hypostases; simply because the essence cannot exist
bare, without any hypostasis.
Third principle:
While the essence and the hypostasis (the “what” and the
“how”) cannot be separated, cannot be parted from each
other, or the one understood without the other,
consequently, neither the hypostases can exist without
essence, nor the essence without a hypostasis, in the case
of God. Nevertheless, there is something that provides a
kind of hierarchy. This hierarchy is derived from the
concept of causality. While there cannot be an essence
without a hypostasis, or a hypostasis without an essence,
nevertheless, the existence of both the essence and the
hypostases – in they way that they are, together, is not
automatic. There is a cause involved.
The concept of
cause, of causality in the existence of God is – I insist –
one of the most important areas of Dogmatics and one of the
most unrecognized; it was introduced by the Cappadocian
Fathers, and it was introduced for the following reasons:
First of all,
it was a counter-position to the Neo-Platonics,
who believed
that the procession from one to another (all this system of
effluences of Plautinus) was a necessity and a natural
evolvement of the one. A downwards evolvement naturally. To
them, the fact that the one being becomes multiple
(and is thus considered evil, because by becoming multiple
other things, the being is degraded) occurred as a kind of
necessity, without the volition of the one.
On the other
hand, the Cappadocian Fathers had to confront the Eunomians,
who had created a principle, a philosophical Theological
principle, on which they based their extreme Arianism,
according to which “the Son is a creation”. What was that
principle? It was that the essence of God and the Father
are one and the same. That the Father and the Essence
are the same thing. Given that the Father is – per the
general acceptance of the Orthodox – the only One Who is
Unborn, then everything that falls outside of the area of
the Father (as for example the Son, Who is Born and not
Unborn) automatically falls outside of the area of the
essence, because the essence of God is exhausted within the
Father; because it relates only to Him. It was therefore
necessary to make this distinction between the essence (the
“what He is”) on the one hand and the “how He is” of the
Father on the other hand, in this instance. “The Father
is one thing, and the essence is another.”
The question is
posed, if the Son is born of the essence of the Father, or
of the Father. Naturally, the Father cannot exist without
an essence. And the 1st Ecumenical Council – on
the basis of the Theology of Saint Athanasius – stresses
that the Son is born of the essence of the Father. If that
is the case, then the essence – as stated by Saint
Athanasius – is fruit-bearing; it produces life. If we rest
here, we must then say that the cause of this fruitfulness
is observed in the life, in the existence of God. This
cause – which explains this fruitfulness – is that very same
essence. Since the essence is fruit-bearing, it therefore
gives birth, just like any other fruit-bearing nature gives
birth.
When the
Cappadocian Fathers introduced the concept of causality, of
the cause, they did this in order to simultaneously defeat
the idea that the cause of this fertility can be something
else other than the Father. The Father is the cause.
When they say that the Father is the cause, they are clearly
contradistinguishing between the Father and the essence. If
they were not contradistinguishing between the two, they
would be falling into the same trap as the Eunomians. The
Father cannot be identified with the essence. Thus, when
they say that the only cause is the Father (and as we know,
the eventual theological heresy related to the “Filioque”
was based on this), then we are not ruling out that we have
(in the case of the Filioque) the Son as the cause; we are
also rebutting the essence as the cause. The cause is the
Father.
Consequently,
this fertile essence –the divine essence- does not
automatically and naturally produce the Triadic Life as a
natural consequence. It produces it via the Father –
via a person – thus, it is in this context of causality,
that we place the Father as the principal Person as
compared to the other two Persons (whose hypostases are
within the Father and are drawn from the Father). They do
not have them by nature; nature itself is also hypostatized
through the Father, and it is for this reason that all of
Triadic life takes place in a state of freedom. It is not a
result of a natural need.
Athanasios the
Great, who was the first to introduce the idea “of the
essence of the Father” and also introduced the image of a
fertile essence, was also the one who said the following,
very important things. When pressured by the Arians into
this dilemma: “So, you say that the Son is of God’s
Essence and not of God’s will? Then the Son must therefore
be the Son out of necessity”, he responded: “Of course
He is not the Son by necessity. Even though He is not of the
will, He is also not the Son by necessity. And why is He not
by necessity? Because it is eternally willed by the Father
and is forever the will of the Father.” And the important
thing is that not only is the Son willed by the Father, but,
as Athanasios says in his third homily against Arians:
«the Father also wills His own hypostasis».
If we keep in mind that –according to Athanasios- the
hypostasis continues to signify the essence (rather, it is
the same thing), we have a double meaning simultaneously:
that the existence of God’s essence, but also the essence of
the Father Himself from which springs the Son, even that is
willed by the Father, and that is why it exists. The
existence of the essence is not compulsory. «the
Father also wills His own hypostasis». I shall read
the entire related passage, because it is of great
significance.
66. Αρ’
ούν επεί φύσει και μη εκ βουλήσεως εστιν ο Υιός,ήδη και
αθέλητός εστι τω Πατρί, και μη βουλομένου του Πατρός εστιν ο
Υιός; Ουμενούν, αλλά και θελόμενος εστιν ο Υιός παρά του
Πατρός, και, ως αυτός φησιν. «Ο Πατήρ φιλεί τον Υιόν, και
πάντα δείκνυσιν αυτώ». Ως γαρ το είναι αγαθός ουκ εκ
βουλήσεως μεν ήρξατο, ου μην αβουλήτως και αθελήτως εστίν
αγαθός’ ό γαρ εστι, τούτο και θελητόν εστιν αυτώ. Ούτω και
το είναι τον Υιόν, ει και μη εκ βουλήσεως ήρξατο, αλλ’ ουκ
αθέλητον, ουδέ παρά γνώμην εστίν αυτώ.
Ώσπερ γαρ της ιδίας
υποστάσεως εστι θελητής, ούτω και ο Υιός, ίδιος ων αυτού της
ουσίας, ουκ αθέλητός εστιν αυτώ. Θελέσθω και φιλεέσθω τοίνυν
ο Υιός παρά του Πατρός και ούτω το θέλειν και το μη
αβούλητον του Θεού τις ευσεβώς λογιζέσθω. Και γαρ ο Υιός τη
θελήσει ή θέλεται παρά του Πατρός, ταύτη και αυτός αγαπά,
και θέλει, και τιμά τον Πατέρα. και έν εστι θέλημα το εκ
Πατρός εν
Υιώ, ως και εκ τούτου θεωρείσθαι τον Υιόν εν τω Πατρί, και
τον Πατέρα εν τω Υιώ. Μη μέντοι κατά Ουαλεντίνον
προηγουμένην τις βούλησιν επεισαγέτω. μηδέ μέσον τις εαυτόν
ωθείτω του μόνου Πατρός προς τον μόνον Λόγον, προφάσει του
βουλεύεσθαι. Μαίνοιτο γαρ αν τις μεταξύ τιθείς Πατρός και
Υιού
βούλησιν και σκέψιν. Και γαρ έτερόν
εστι λέγειν, Βουλήσει γέγονεν, έτερον δε ότι Ίδιον φύσει τον
Υιόν αυτού αγαπά και θέλει αυτόν. Το μεν γαρ λέγειν, Εκ
βουλήσεως γέγονε, πρώτον μεν το μη είναί ποτε τούτον
σημαίνει. έπτεια δε, και την επ’ άμφω ροπήν έχει, καθάπερ
είρηται. ώστε δύνασθαι τινα νοείν, ότι ηδύνατο και μη
βούλεσθαι τον Υιόν.
Επί Υιού δε λέγειν, Ηδύνατο και μη είναι,
δυσσεβές εστι και φθάνον εις την του Πατρός ουσίαν το
τόλμημα. ει γε το ίδιον αυτής ηδύνατο μη είναι. Όμοιον γαρ
ως ει ελέγετο, Ηδύνατο και μη είναι αγαθός ο Πατήρ. Αλλ’
ώσπερ αγαθός αεί και τη φύσει, ούτως αεί γεννητικός τη φύσει
ο Πατήρ. το δε λέγειν, Ο Πατήρ θέλει τον Υιόν, και, Ο Λόγος
θέλει τον Πατέρα, ου βούλησιν προηγουμένην δείκνυσιν, αλλά
φύσεως γνησιότητα, και ουσίας ιδιότητα και ομοίωσιν γνωρίζει.
Ως γαρ και επί του απαυγάσματος αν τις είποι και του φωτός,
ότι το απαύγασμα ουκ έχει μεν βούλησιν προηγουμένην εν τω
φωτί. έστι δε φύσει αυτού γέννημα θελόμενον παρά του φωτός,
τού και γεννήσαντος αυτό, ουκ εν σκέψει βουλήσεως, αλλά
φύσει και αληθεία. ούτω και επί του Πατρός και του Υιού
ορθώς αν τις είποι, ότι ο Πατήρ αγαπά και θέλει τον Υιό, και
ο Υιός αγαπά και θέλει τον Πατέρα.
Rendition of
the above text:
66. So,
because He is the Son by nature and not by choice, is He
then also unwanted by the Father? And, is the Son also not
willed by the Father? Indeed no; the Son is indeed desired
by the Father, and, as it is said: «The Father loves the
Son, and everything points to this». For, just as His
benevolence –albeit not a product of His will- was neither
against His will nor unwanted by Him implies that it was
desirable to Him; thus it is with the Son, Who, albeit did
not originate from God’s will, nevertheless, He was not
unwanted, nor was He against the opinion of the Father.
For, just as
the Father willed His own hypostasis, likewise the
hypostasis of the Son - who is of the selfsame essence as
the Father – is not unwilled by the Son. The Son is
therefore wanted and loved by the Father, and it is thus,
that one should consider God’s voluntary and not unwilled
status. For the Son is also willingly wanted by the Father,
and He likewise loves, wants and honors the Father, and the
will of the Father in the Son is one and the same, so that,
it is
in this, that we consider the Son as being “in the Father”,
and the Father as being “in the Son”. One should not
introduce the Valentinian view of a precedent will, nor
should anyone be persuaded that the only means that the
Father has towards the Son, is on the pretext of His will.
For they
would be insane, to interpose any wanting and thinking
between the Father and the Son. For it is another thing to
say that “it occurred by His volition” and another thing
that “it is of God’s selfsame nature to love His Son and to
want Him”. Because, when saying that “it occurred by His
volition”, first of all, it could imply that the Son may not have existed before this volition; furthermore, it
could imply the existence of a reciprocal tendency, inasmuch
as one could anticipate the potential of (the Father) not
wanting the Son.
When saying about the Son
“It is also possible that He may not have always existed”,
it would be disrespectful and would also be reaching the
point of daring to touch on the essence of the Father,
inasmuch as that selfsame essence could ever possibly have
not existed at some time. For it would be the same as
saying “the Father is not benevolent”. Thus, just as the
Father is perpetually benevolent by nature, likewise is He
perpetually birth-giving by nature; When saying that “the
Father wants the Son” and “the Son wants the Father”, it
does not indicate the one’s preceding will to want the
other; it is in fact a veridicality of His nature and a
feature of His essence, and a acknowledgement of the
likeness. Just as when one similarly speaks of the
brilliance of light (inasmuch as the brilliance does not
have any precedent will, inside the light), that by nature
it is a birth, willed by the light which gave birth to it,
and not through any thought of volition, but only by nature
and veracity, likewise, when speaking of the Father and the
Son, it is correct for one to say that the Father loves and
wants the Son, and the Son loves and wants the Father.
That the Son of
God is of the essence of the Father does not mean that He is
the Son by necessity. Based on this principle that already
existed since Athanasios the Great, the Cappadocians
proceeded to make the following, delicate distinctions: The
distinction of causality, i.e., that the cause of the Son is
the Father, since the Father Himself willed His own
hypostasis, therefore He must have equally willed the Son’s
hypostasis.
We are heading
towards the limits of ontology; we cannot go any deeper.
We are asking if God exists because He wants to exist, or
because He cannot but exist. When we say that “He willed His
own hypostasis”, we are saying that He exists because He
wants to exist, and not because He cannot do otherwise but
exist. It was on the basis of this principle of Athanasios
that the Cappadocians named the Father the “cause”: It is
His “fault” that God exists; He is the cause. However, the
“Father” is not the essence; the name “Father” does not
denote essence; it is not the name of the essence. It is the
name of a person. Therefore, the cause of being lies in the
freedom of the person, and in God, and is in no way
automatic and compulsory.
That the
Cappadocians are concerned with stressing precisely this –
the freedom of the Father and the freedom of God – is
apparent in the words of Saint Gregory the Theologian in his
third theological homily. In this Neo-Platonic passage he
attacks both the Eunomians as well as the Greek,
Neo-Platonic philosophers. He is most probably addressing
the Neo-Platonics, although the concept of a crater
(drinking vessel) and the overflowing of benevolence,
inasmuch as God is benevolent and resembles a crater that
overflows with goodness, is a concept that also existed
during Plato; however, here specifically, it is with
reference to the first and the second cause. The reference
is therefore to Plautinus, who believed that the first and
the second cause, i.e., the “one” that becomes many, is an
unwilled, natural result. This is where Gregory responded:
“This, to us, is unacceptable.
Why is it unacceptable?
Because we would thus be introducing an involuntary birth?”
To us, says
Gregory, the birth of the Son cannot be involuntary. If it
takes place involuntarily, then we are introducing this
Platonic concept of first and second cause; of the natural
overflowing, of a fertile nature, which consequently gives
birth. This is a naturalistic, physiocratic perception. It
contains the element of necessity. The only reason that
Gregory is annoyed by this Platonic idea, is none other than
because it contained the element of involuntariness (“we
would thus be introducing an involuntary birth”). He is
obviously trying to stress the voluntary status of the birth
of the Son, otherwise, we would eventually end up saying
that the entire Holy Trinity exists out of necessity, as a
natural consequence of the essence.
The 2nd
Ecumenical Synod brought about an alteration to the Creed of
the 1st Ecumenical Synod, and also brought about
a few other minor changes. Whether it contributed, is one of
the darkest and most talked about problems. Does the Creed
as we know it today belong to the 2nd Ecumenical
Synod or not? Regardless, the 2nd Ecumenical
Synod is historically linked to the Creed that we use today,
which says that “the Son is born of the Father”. At
this point, the Nicene Creed, which is the basis of the
Creed of Constantinople, had said: “…born of the
Father. That is, of the essence of the Father…”
What happened to the words “That is, of the essence of
the Father”? Why were they removed?
Why did
all these problems arise between the years
325 and
381 A.D., which
would have made evident the serious possibility that the
birth of the Son would be perceived as compulsory, if we
said “of the essence”? It would not have meant that the 2nd
Ecumenical Synod refuted the 1st. It simply
meant that it was being correctly interpreted; that it had
to be thus interpreted, and not in any other way, because
the Arians and the Eunomians were presenting interpretations
containing involuntariness in the birth of the Son. In
order therefore to avoid this compulsoriness, it made
allowances for this change. One could say many more things,
to show that for the Fathers, the basic principle was that
while essence cannot be without a hypostasis, the cause
of a being is the Person of the Father, the hypostasis of
the Father. And the purpose of this statement is to oust
the idea of compulsoriness in the existence of God. It
introduces the concept of FREEDOM within the existence of
the Holy Trinity.