The vent, the timely solution to this problem, was
given by the Cappadocian Fathers during the 4th century,
through a radical innovation, the “innovating of names” as they
called it. Names had to be innovated, be given a new meaning. What
the Cappadocian Fathers did, was the following: Whereas up to that
day the term ‘hypostasis’ related to the term ‘essence’ (Athanasios
the Great clearly states that the two are the same thing), the
Cappadocians took a further step (you see how they dared during
those times) and said that here, we shall discern between these two
meanings. The meaning of the word essence and the meaning of
the word hypostasis do not signify the same thing, hence a
very serious problem arose. The first Ecumenical Synod placed an
anathema on those who accepted, who confessed that God is one
essence or Hypostasis. Amendments followed………… The Cappadocians now
said the following: that the term ‘essence’ is identical to the
term ‘nature’ and is used to denote the unity, the Oneness of God.
God is therefore one essence, one nature. The Latin term
‘substantia’ is henceforth translated into Greek, no longer as
‘hypostasis’, but as essence, or nature. On the other hand however,
the term ‘hypostasis’ is transposed (note this revolution in
terminology), to now become equal to, to relate to the term
‘person’. Thus, the term ‘person’ in this light, now ceases
to bear the meaning that Savellius had given it. Because now,
‘three persons’ no longer implies three facades, since the person,
which is now related to the hypostasis, signifies three entities.
So, from the historical aspect of philosophy, it is both a timely
and a revolutionary move, even though it has not been given any
special mention in the history of philosophy, significant as it may
be. A term such as hypostasis which is an ontological term, is now
related to a term such as the person, which was never an
ontological term but had always existed, and had always denoted an
association that appended to an entity. We are thus relating the
being: I am, let’s say, who I am; my being is not dependent on the
role that I play, or on my person. My person and I, are not the
same thing. Just like an actor, who plays a role: he has a
person,
but that is not his actual being. In the same way, the Savellian
view was that God is One Being, but He plays these roles.
Therefore, Savellius was quite happy with this use of the person,
but as we said, it did not appeal to orthodox Christians. And it was
for this reason that Basil the Great insisted on saying that
this expression “God has three faces” is unacceptable to us, unless
the term hypostasis is included, to denote that the person is a
hypostasis. What happens in this case : By saying that I am a
person, it now means that I have an entity of my own, different to
another’s entity. In this way, the person acquires an ontological
meaning. But we shall look into these matters in detail, when we
interpret the dogma of the Trinity existentially.
Now you can understand how, historically, this
revolution in terminology was not entirely arbitrary; It was because
the term ‘hypostasis’ bore several nuances which allowed this
development. But here, we are mainly interested in the outcome, and
the outcome of the Cappadocian Fathers’ theology was that: God is
One – as regards His essence, His nature – and He is also Three – as
regards His Persons, His Hypostases. And this, as far as
terminology is concerned; this is how we arrived at the formulation
of the dogma of the Holy Trinity which we have to this day.
And now for the meaning. What they meant by it.
When we say that God is one Essence and three Persons, with the
term Essence we always refer to something general, something that
implies the existence of more than one being. For instance, when we
say ‘human essence’ or ‘human nature’, this denotes that while all
of us are of one essence, one nature – human nature – we are each
individually a complete human being; that is, this one nature has
many in number. These ‘many in number’ we call hypostases, or
persons. This analogy, this picture, was used by the Fathers. The
Cappadocian Fathers say: Look here, what we theologians are saying
about God is not so unreasonable, because if in fact we observe
humanity, we can see that mention is made of one essence, one nature
and simultaneously of two, three, four etc. hypostases of this same
nature; they are the numerous ways, in which this nature appears.
But, this now immediately brings on the danger of three gods,
because we many humans are many people, therefore don’t we similarly
have many gods? If we espouse this example, how do we avoid
multi-deities?
This is where the Cappadocians’ extremely difficult
task begins. They pose the question: Why are we humans many and are
consequently able to speak of a number of people, whereas in the
case of God, we cannot speak of a number of gods? The answer is
that because we humans have been created, and our given nature –
human nature – is divisible; for example, me and my father are two
separate human beings. Between him and me, time has intervened (or
distance, in other cases, while he is still alive), and this factor
of time or space allows each one of us to be perceived as a
self-existent person ( i.e. my father does not exist now, but I do).
In other words, time has permitted individuality. It has permitted
me to be perceived independently of my father, and it is in this
manner that nature is segmented, just as when man is born entirely
individually, nature is segmented; because each person can be
perceived individually, on his own, as a separate person. This is
why we have many people and the unity of the human race cannot be
ensured, or, rather, why it conflicts with the multiplicity of those
individual persons. In order to simplify this difficult issue, I
will promptly apply the example to the case of God, as the
Cappadocians did. Supposing that, in order to comprehend this
example, there is no intervening time or space between us,
and nature is not segmented during our birth, what would happen
existentially? What would happen, is that me and my father would
never be apart; it would be inconceivable to have any void
whatsoever between him and me….. But what does that mean? It means
that in essence, we would be two persons, two persons that are
different to each other, and, because we could never be apart, we
would always be one. Subsequently, how can unity be ensured?
By an incessant communion – relationship between us. Thus,
that which breaks up the communion – the association – between my
father and me, is time and distance. Time and space are attributes
of the created world. They appear precisely during Creation; it is
impossible to refer to time and space with regard to God, and not
inevitably face the matter of God’s origin, i.e., that ‘once upon a
time, God did not exist’. In order to preserve God’s eternity, which
is a contiguous and inherent factor of the concept of God that sets
Him apart from the created world, we must necessarily exclude any
admission of space and time within God’s existence. Therefore, in
the instance of God, we have this as a certain reality. And what
does that mean? That here, multiplicity does not conflict with
unity. That is the mystery of the Holy Trinity; a mystery with
regard to our experience, because for us, multiplicity always
conflicts with unity. It is a mystery as regards our experience,
however, from the moment that you accept God as an uncreated God
Who is not subject to time and space, it ceases to be a mystery.
What happens? One assumes an inevitable stance towards God. It is
a stance, which, if not taken, one loses the meaning of God; one
looks upon God as a creation. I repeat, all these things presuppose
that you have decided from the start to accept the mystery of the
Holy Trinity. You will not prove why God is Threefold. You
will try to prove how this can be so; how you can
perceive this mystery. But with what kind of speculation, what kind
of thought? We shall see how it is not simply a matter of
speculation or thinking that is directed at satisfying a certain
curiosity of the mind, but something that has immediate
consequences. Our entire life changes, if God is not Triadic.
If God is not triadic, man’s life is a totally
different thing. If God is Triadic, if this mystery is
indeed real, and this comparison that I made, between our own
experience (where singularity and multiplicity conflict with one
another) and the experience (or rather the existence) of God, where
this conflict does not occur; and if there is no unity wherein
multiplicity is not a conflicting factor, then, a number of
things in our existence are jeopardized. The Dogma on the Holy
Trinity is the most bountiful existential message that any religion
or a philosophy could possess. Now, let us focus on the historic
outcome. The Cappadocian Fathers had said that the aforementioned
example of one human nature with a multitude of people could be
applied to God, provided that we do not include time and space in
the equation - this being a self-evident condition anyway, with
regard to the existence of God, thus, we automatically cease to have
the problem of three Gods within the Holy Trinity.
When they express this unity, the one essence, i.e.
the association of God with the term essence, they immediately give
rise to the following problem: whether this essence pre-exists, and
somehow becomes a Trinity at a later stage – which is something that
occurs in us humans; something that the Greek philosophers had
already pinpointed when they said that all us people come into
existence as separate beings and diverse, from one, pre-existing
essence, a pre-existing nature. I would say that nature pre-exists
in us, and it is followed by the person. When I came into this
world, it wasn’t me that brought the essence of humanity – human
nature – into existence. Human nature existed before me, and it is
this point that the ancient Greek philosophers had expanded
in a general manner, to say that this essence, this general thing in
which many participate, is pre-existent and is followed by the more
specific thing – the person. Hence, the Platonic philosophers
spoke of a “predominating kind” and the Aristotelians of a
“subjective kind” – implying that, no matter what each one of us is
individually, as an individual human being, we are but sequels of an
existence. For the Platonians, we are sequels of the ideal human
being in which we all participate, while for the Aristotelians, we
are sequels of human nature, of the human species which we all
spring from. The human species precedes the human being, and that
is why - according to Aristotle – in death the particular beings may
disappear, but the species itself survives. Consequently, for us,
the essence precedes the person. You will see the existential
importance of this, later on.
The Cappadocian Fathers here are carving new paths in
philosophy, on account of the Dogma of the Holy Trinity. Basil
makes the following statement as a basis, as an axiom of his entire
subsequent argument: There is no “bare” essence as he called it.
With this, he meant that there could not be any essence without a
hypostasis; an essence that does not have actual and specific
hypostases. Therefore, it is impossible to presuppose a human
nature, out of which specific beings can spring from. One must
consider that all specific beings are equally primeval in ontology,
along with the essence of humanity. Therefore, given that bare
essence cannot exist, one cannot accept essence without any specific
hypostases.
Now, if this is applied to the human species, what
does it mean? That the origin and the unity – that which ensures the
continuum of the human species – does not lie in the essence of
humanity, because bare essence never existed on its own. For
example, Aristotle discerns between a human being in general
(this is the essence) and Kallias or Socrates who are persons,
hypostases. According to the Cappadocian line of thought, it is
impossible to mention the term human essence without automatically
implying Kallias or Socrates or George or Costa or someone. It is
impossible to refer to the essence alone, without implying the
specific persons; in other words, this primary, general humanity
does not exist. Even today, frequent mention is made, especially of
‘humanity’; ‘Humanity’ means specific persons. And no matter how
strange it may seem to you, all these things have sprung from the
Dogma of the Holy Trinity, with a profound impact on anthropology.
Since there is no bare essence, and we cannot subsequently presume
that the origin of the human species is a human essence or Plato’s
ideal human, or nature, as Aristotle’s definition, then what is the
origin and the cause that makes man singular, if it isn’t his
essence?
This issue is discussed in one of Basil’
Epistles, in his dialogue with Amphilochios. These Epistles had been
considered questionable, but they are very probably genuine and
there is no serious reason for anyone to doubt them. At any rate,
the topic is found in Basil’ epistles. In one of these epistles,
the problem is thoroughly analyzed, and Basil totally agrees
with the viewpoint that since a ‘bare’ human essence cannot be the
origin of humankind, the chief ontological predicate of a human
being cannot be his essence; it must definitely be a specific
being, and that being is Adam. Thus, while the ancient Greeks said
that we draw our descent, our existence as particular beings, from a
common, human nature, we must – as Christians – say that we each
draw our existence from one person, Adam. The cause of
our being is not our nature; it is a person.
By applying this to God, observe the consequences:
The Cappadocians for the first time in theology introduce the
meaning of ‘agent’ – that the one God is not just one Essence, but
that He is the Father, and that He as a Person makes manifest the
unity of the Trinity, and not He as an essence. Naturally the term
‘one essence’ continues to exist, but not in the sense of a
causative essence. It is not essence that causes God to have
hypostases. Essence functions differently now. The ultimate and
the foremost point of reference for the existence of God is not the
Essence, it is the Father. This means that you cannot proceed from
the essence of God in order to subsequently reach the Father. You
start from the Father, and, because He claims to be a Person and
not an essence, He bears the characteristic of not being ‘only’;
whereas essence can be understood as something on its own, and
essence is of course one.
In this way, we bypass the principial status of the
unit, by introducing multiplicity as something primeval in ontology,
in God’s being; obviously, the meaning of the term ‘Father’ has no
ground on its own, without the existence at least of a Son. Whose
Father would He be, if a Son didn’t exist? We would then have to
concede that He wasn’t always ‘Father’. However, if He
was always the ‘Father’, then the Son must also have existed
always. Thus, this multiplicity, this interdependence of the
persons, becomes a chief ontological predicate; in other words, you
cannot go past it, or behind it, in order to discover something that
precedes it and leads us to it. The one Essence is not a precedent,
and it is not the ‘cause’ of God’s being. Precedent is the Father,
as the agent, but because by definition He is automatically in a
communion, He cannot be acknowledged as a single unit.
This is how we must comprehend the expression “God
is Love”. Because it is directly related to the triadic dogma, this
point underwent many clarifications by the Cappadocian Fathers.
That God is love, is a statement that was not first made by
Christianity; Plato had already said the same thing. On the other
hand, Gregory Nazianzene rejects the idea that God is love, in the
sense that divine nature overflows with goodness, like an
overflowing vessel; i.e., love is no longer an emotion. That is not
the meaning of love. ‘God is love’ means that God is constituted as
an existence; He exists, within personal associations. Communion is
a prime component of God’s existence; it is not something that God
acquires in retrospect. Just as we can say ‘I exist and additionally
I love someone’, we must try to imagine an instance where we cannot
say ‘I exist, only if I am in communion with someone else’ otherwise
I lose my identity, I disappear. This is the reason that God is
primarily the Father, inasmuch as He loses His identity altogether
if He does not have the Son. And subsequently, love – that
communion which causes us to exist – is not an emotion. Love is not
an emotion; it is a relationship that causes us to exist. Love
actually proves to be love, when the existential thread is cut, and
you begin to float in a void. For example, death will cut this
thread, and you realize that you no longer exist, if this thread is
not reconnected. Because it is the other person, it is the
communion with the other person that comprises the basis of
your entire being.
Well, “God is love” essentially means that God is a
Holy Trinity. It is nothing else. His essence is communion. And
what do we mean by ‘is’ communion? It means that we cannot
imagine Him, not even as a fabrication, as an ‘Only’; Just as you
cannot ever imagine yourself alone, in love. Not unless you love
yourself, in which case, it is not true love. So, therefore, if you
take away the Trinity and make God a unit, then you automatically
create the problem of whom God loves. There is none other besides
God, because that is the notion of God : He is without a beginning,
and He comes before the world.
Many people have this naïve thought, that God is love
because He loves the world; but then, the world didn’t always
exist. By definition, we cannot imply that the world is something
eternal, and God likewise eternal, or co-eternal. If therefore God
loves the world and thus exists as love, then He wasn’t always love:
He becomes love. He is not love; he
becomes love, when the world comes into existence ( unless you
follow the same steps as Origen and several others, who transferred
the cosmos into eternity; in other words, to accept the world as
being eternal and that the world somehow always existed in God’s
mind. ) But then, God would be deprived of His freedom, because He
would be obliged to possess this world and He could not exist
without this world. If God – this is a biblical demand – is
absolutely transcendental, if God is imaginable (and He should be
imaginable without the existence of the world), then, necessarily,
(a) He either is not love or (b) He loves Himself – who is not love
– or (c) He must be a Trinity.
The expression “I love myself” Implies the
prerequisites of a subject and a verb: the Father loves the Son, the
Son loves the Father, the Father loves the Spirit, the Spirit loves
the Father, the Son… they each love more than one. In this way, God
does not love Himself, i.e. selfishly; He loves a certain person;
He loves as a person, because God is a Father, a person. The
essence does not love; the person loves.
With Augustine, all of what I told
you up to now is cancelled. Because from there onwards, an entirely
new position is taken, on which many things will depend, such as the
Filioque and many other things. But, compared to the essence of the
problem, the Filioque issue is minute in size. The problem is
summarized in the following: Does the essence of God precede the
person? Augustine couldn’t grasp the Cappadocians’ thoughts on
this issue, and thus made the mistake of considering the Essence of
God – the one Essence – as being the One God; hence the beginning of
tremendous problems. In our next lesson, before closing our
historical overview, we shall examine Augustine’s theory. Then we
shall go on to an existential interpretation, i.e., to see if all
these things are of any significance, or if they are simply things
that we theologians say, in order to preserve traditions. Anyway,
can anyone say things without explaining them? The Fathers
exhausted themselves in their attempt to explain these issues,
because they could see the huge existential consequences that the
Dogma on the Holy Trinity would have.